We develop a dynamic regulation game for a stock externality under asymmetric information and future market uncertainty. Within this framework, regulation is characterized as the implementation of a welfare-maximization program conditional on informational constraints. We identify the most general executable such programs and find these yield simple and intuitive policy rules. We apply our theory to carbon dioxide emissions trading schemes and find substantial welfare gains are possible, compared to current practices.
Work-in-progress, 2018

We develop a two-regions emission trading model for a global homogeneous pollutant with uncertain benefits of emissions. We develop a structural analysis of trade welfare gains and identify the optimal quantity-based emission trade agreement that adjusts cumulative available permits in response to trade flows. The mechanism corrects for the differential in uncertainty and responsiveness of marginal benefits between regions, yielding substantial welfare gains and reduced price volatility compared to standard trading.
Work-in-progress, 2018

EAERE Magazine, 2018

In Dutch. Report written on request of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality regarding the question how – i.e. using which mechanism – the rights to build windmill parks on the North Sea are best allocated.
Government report, 2018


  • Grondslagen Macro-economie (Dutch; 2016 - 2018)
  • Macroeconomics for EOR (2017 - 2018)
  • MSc thesis supervision (2018)